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I
Introduction
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TA96") is a
revolutionary piece of legislation.1 Prior regulatory reforms in other
industries, like railroad freight transportation, mandated less
government intervention and increased freedom on the part of firms.
The TA96, however, moves in a different direction, adding regulatory
mechanisms that ostensibly seek to increase the number of local
exchange carriers ("LECs") and to increase innovation in the
provision of local telecommunications service. Congress concluded
that mandated access by new entrants, referred to as competitive
LECs ("CLECs"), to the incumbent LECs' ("ILECs") local loop 2
and related facilities was necessary to spur competition for local
telephone service because it believed that the facilities were essential
to entry in many cases.
The TA96 attempted to encourage new entry in local exchange
services in three ways: (1) require interconnection of physical
networks and reciprocal compensation between carriers for the
transport and termination of local traffic; (2) require ILECs to
"unbundle" those elements of their networks that are necessary for
competition - i.e., unbundled network elements ("UNEs") - and
allow CLECs to purchase them to augment their own facilities in
order to provide competitive local service; and (3) require ILECs to
make their retail local service offerings available to CLECs on a
discounted wholesale basis. The unbundling requirement permits a
CLEC to compete with an ILEC using a mix of its own network
facilities while leasing others from the ILEC. Congress envisioned
the ability of leasing such facilities as enhancing the development of
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Justice Scalia suggests, however,
that the drafting of the TA96 leaves much to be desired. He states:
It would be gross understatement to say that the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It is in many respects a model of
ambiguity or indeed even self contradiction. That is most unfortunate
for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of
the economy worth tens of billions of dollars.
A T& T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
2. The local loop refers to the cable that runs from an end-user's location (e.g., a
home or a business) to the LEC's local switching office. These cable facilities consist of
both copper and fiber optic cables.
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. at 56.
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new, competing local networks.4 Furthermore, it was maintained that
permitting CLECs to purchase retail services at wholesale prices
allows CLECs to offer a broader range of services than they may
otherwise have been able to offer.5
The TA96 and the Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC") resulting regulations have generated significant legal
controversy.6 Unsurprisingly, one central dispute relates to the
appropriate charges that CLECs should pay for UNEs and other
network facilities. Overcharging for UNEs, for example, would allow
ILECs to set prices above competitive levels - if there are no
substitutes for such service.7 In the presence of supracompetitive
UNE fees, CLECs would not be able to offer alternative services in a
competitive manner, and efficient leasing of ILEC facilities would be
retarded. Alternatively, setting the prices of UNEs too low would
induce inefficient entry through the uneconomic leasing of ILEC
UNEs and discourage ILECs from maintaining and expanding their
networks, even when such investments would be economically
efficient. CLECs could take advantage of the artificially low price of
using UNEs, while the ILEC would be left under-compensated.
Conceptually, the price of UNEs could be set from three
different perspectives. First, the regulatory body could calculate the
historical costs of the facilities employed in the ILEC's network and
project them into the future. Such an approach would be "backward
looking," accounting for the historical expenditures the ILEC
incurred in originally building the network. While this method of cost
calculation would permit ILECs to recover historical costs, historical
information does not necessarily reflect the market value of existing
facilities. In addition, using historical costs has attributes similar to
those existing under traditional rate-of-return regulation. Relying on
historical costs reduces incentives to innovate and reduce costs.
Second, the regulatory body could use the costs of operating
modern, efficient technology, regardless of whether the ILEC
employs it. The FCC has selected this model for UNE pricing,
4. See H.R. Rpt. 104-204, at §§ 47-50 (July 24, 1995) (reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11-13).
5. See H.R. Conf. Rpt. 104-458, at §§ 117-118 (Jan. 31, 1996) (reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 128-129).
6. The TA96 charged the FCC with implementing provisions of the Act. See 47
U.S.C. § 251.
7. We focus on UNE costs in this Article because UNE cost methods are applied
to reciprocal compensation and they are sometimes used as a cost reference for other
aspects of an ILEC's network.
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requiring that "the total element long-run incremental cost
["TELRIC"] of an element should be measured based on the use of
the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available
and the lowest cost network configuration available."8 This "efficient
network" approach represents a long-run, idealized, static model of
efficiency. While this approach is likely to spur entry into local
telecommunications services, it may seriously undercompensate
ILECs and may lead to excessive UNE leasing by CLECs.
Furthermore, this approach does not satisfy the compensation
requirements of the TA96, as the Eighth Circuit recently concluded
in Iowa Utilities Board v. Federal Communications Commission.9 The
United States Supreme Court is currently reviewing this decision.10
Third, the regulatory body could use the actual incremental costs
that the ILEC incurs or will incur. This approach would include cost
reductions from an ILEC's anticipated technological upgrades. This
perspective reflects a dynamically efficient market where costs are
incurred to move from one technology to another and where new
technologies may be introduced over time - when an economic
justification exists to replace the older technology. This approach
retains incentives for ILECs to maintain and upgrade their networks
while encouraging efficient entry. Importantly, this "back to the
future" method compensates ILECs in a manner more consistent
with the requirements of the TA96. The Eighth Circuit's recent
opinion in Iowa Utilities has suggested this third approach would be a
more appropriate costing method than the FCC's interpretation of
TELRIC.11
In this Article, we conclude that the Eighth Circuit's legal
framework is more consistent with sound economic principles than
either the TELRIC or historical approaches. Using actual
incremental costs creates a more efficient competitive standard for
local telephony. Section II of this Article summarizes the TA96,
discussing the provisions that relate to LECs, the legislative history of
the TA96 and the Eighth Circuit's recent case interpreting the UNE
pricing provision. In Section III, we explore the various economic
approaches for UNE pricing and explain why an approach based on
the incremental costs of using the ILECs' actual network with
8. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (1999).
9. 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001); see also
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Commn., Nos. 99-3833, 99-3908, 2001 WL
13289 (8th Cir. Jan. 8, 2001).
10. FCC v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 531 U.S. 1124.
11. 219 F.3d at 750-52.
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expected network upgrades represents the best method for costing
UNEs. In this section, we also discuss why this "back to the future"
approach falls within the legal ambit of the TA96. Finally, in Section
IV, we offer some concluding remarks.
II
.Overview of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The growth of American Telegraph and Telephone ("AT&T")
as a dominant telephone provider by the early 1930s spurred
Congress to pass the Telecommunications Act of 1934 ("Act"). 2 The
Act's purpose was to "regulat[e] interstate and foreign' commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available.., a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service.' 3 The Act treated telecommunications service providers as
monopolies and subjected them to rate regulation." The belief that
the telecommunications industry gravitated toward natural monopoly
was manifested in state government policies that gave exclusive
franchises to telecommunications companies."5  As Congress
observed, government policy "relied on heavily regulated monopolies
to provide communications services to businesses and consumers.
1 6
Originally, rate of return regulation was the predominant form
of ILEC regulation.7 This form of regulation examined the ILEC's
costs associated with providing local service, including government
mandated services, and estimated a reasonable rate of return based
on this cost structure."8 Rates reflected embedded cost plus some
12. See Aimee M. Adler, Competition in Telephony: Perception or Reality? Current
Barriers to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 J.L. & Policy 571, 574 (1999). Prior to
the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T avoided regulation and antitrust action through
a voluntary commitment to interconnect its long distance network to all local providers in
the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913. AT&T remained free to refuse to interconnect its
local network with competing local networks. At the time, the long distance network was
considered by many to be the troublesome bottleneck point in the network. See e.g.
Gerald W. Brock, Telecommunications Policy for the Information Age 65, 66, 102 (1994);
Hank Brands & Evan T. Leo, The Law and Regulation of Telecommunications Carriers 4
(Harv. Univ. Press 1999).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
15. See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 370.
16. H.R. Rpt. 104-204, at § 47 (July 24, 1995) (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
11).
17. See Joseph D. Kearney, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC? 71 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1153, 1175-78 (2000).
18. The FCC has often mandated the provision of telecommunications services to
satisfy social policy goals. Congress has done so itself on occasion. See e.g. 47 U.S.C. § 225
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specified rate of return. Thus, local and state authorities fixed the
rates ILECs could charge customers in order to achieve a targeted
return for ILEC investors.
In addition, regulators often pursued public policy goals
designed to keep rates low for some politically sensitive services -
primarily residential local services to promote universal service
objectives, especially in rural areas. 9 This led to relatively higher
rates for less politically sensitive services, like business services.
These patterns of cross-subsidy were significant, long-lived, and
widespread in the United States." In order to sustain these policy-
induced patterns of cross-subsidy, regulators found it essential to
attempt to preclude entry into telecommunications markets. Thus,
many laws existed that insulated ILECs from the threat of potential
entry into local service."
This regulated regime began to crumble visibly with the
government's antitrust case against AT&T.22 AT&T resulted in a
consent decree that broke up AT&T into Regional Bell Operating
(1994) (mandating telecommunications services for the hearing impaired and that prices
for these services be no more than comparable voice services).
19. See e.g. Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
20. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in
Telecommunications, 11 Yale J. Reg. 119, 131 (1994); Steve G. Parsons, Cross-
Subsidization in Telecommunications, 13 J. Reg. Econ. 157, 165-69 (1998); see also
Economic Report of the President 177 (1996); Leland L. Johnson, Competition and Cross-
Subsidization in the Telephone Industry xi, 60 (1982) (Rand Corporation, R-2976-
RC/NSF) (finding a $16/line national average monthly subsidy to residential local rates);
Alfred E. Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 Yale J. Reg. 139, 143
n.2 (1984) ("These inefficient pricing practices are the consequence and instrument of a
complex network of cross-subsidies between different customer groups. First, long-
distance service under the present system grossly subsidizes local service."); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, Telecommunications Law and Policy 349, 350 (1998) (noting five
categories of cross-subsidies: business-residence; urban-rural; long distance-local; heavy-
light users; universal service); John Wenders, The Economics of Telecommunication:
Theory and Policy 177 (1987) ("[Pjrices do depart from marginal cost significantly in the
telecommunications industry - they are too high in toll and too low in the residence local
market - and therefore corresponding subsidy flows exist in this industry."); but see
David Gabel, Pricing Voice Telephone Services: Who is Subsidizing Whom? 19 Telecomm.
Policy 453, 464 (Eisener Science Ltd. 1995).
21. See Robert G. Harris & C.J. Kraft, Meddling Through: Regulating Local
Telephone Competition in the United States, 11 J. Econ. Perps. 95, 97 (1997).
22. U.S. v. Am. Tel.. & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). However,
the FCC moved toward more competitive policies in telecommunications prior to the
AT&T decision through various regulations. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323,
1341-43 (1998); Kearney, supra n. 17, at 1171, 1175-76.
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Companies ("RBOCs") and a long distance telephone provider.23 The
divestiture spun off the long distance portion of the Bell System
largely to create a more level playing field for the now-competitive
long distance telephone services. 4 The RBOCs were required to
provide non-discriminatory access to long distance providers, but
were not required to open up the local loop for competition. 5 After
the divestitures, the RBOCs controlled the largest ILECs.26
With respect to local service, the government continued to
pursue policies that generally supported rate regulation, including
protection from competitive entry.27 Without access to the local loop,
local entry was very limited. Prior to the enactment of. the TA96, the
top ten local telephone companies controlled ninety-two percent of
the local telephone network 8 Moreover, none of the top ten
telephone companies competed between each other for local
service. 29As the House Report for the TA96 stated:
In the overwhelming majority of markets today, because of
their government sanctioned-monopoly status, local
providers maintain bottleneck control over the essential
facilities needed for the provision of local telephone service.
The bottleneck consists of the elements needed to originate
and terminate a telephone call - the equipment with
capabilities of routing and signaling calls, network capacity
and network standards. The inability of other service
providers to gain access to the local telephone companies
equipment inhibits competition that could otherwise
develop in the local exchange market.30
One of the goals of the TA96 was to open telecommunications
23. U.S. v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. at 139.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. However, rate regulation became more flexible. Following the lead of the FCC
from the late 1980s, many state jurisdictions adopted alternative, more flexible forms of
regulation such as price cap regulation. See Kearney, supra n. 17, at 1178; Alexander C.
Larson, An Economic Guide to Competitive Standards in Telecommunications Regulation,
1 CommLaw Conspectus 31, 36-40 (1993); 16 State Telephone Regulation Report (No. 7,
Aug. 20, 1999, & No. 8, Sept. 3, 1999) (Thirty-six states had substituted price caps or
incentive regulation for traditional cost-plus, rate base/rate of return regulation at the
time the article appeared.). Price cap systems allowed LECs to price freely within a
specified range.
28. H.R. Rpt. No. 104-204, at § 50 (1995) (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 13).
29. Id.
30. Id. at § 49 (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 13).
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competition in the local exchange segment of the industry. By
opening local telephone services to competition, the House Report
found that "[t]echnological advances would be more rapid and
services would be more widely available and at lower prices. ,31
In order to achieve these ends, the TA96 continues the historic
dual jurisdiction of federal and state oversight of the
telecommunications industry.32 The federal role under these statutes
is to foster competition and create a competitive framework for
LECs.33 The states are given the more limited authority to implement
and tailor the federal framework in a manner that does not
contravene it.34 The TA96 bars states and local governments from
"prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service. ,35 Additionally, it gives the
FCC the authority to preempt any state or local laws that have the
effect of acting as entry barriers. 6 This dual jurisdiction is reflected in
several other aspects of the TA96. For example, states are authorized
to approve certain agreements between LECs that foster
competition, but they are to do so under a pricing framework
established by Congress.37 Similarly, states are authorized to establish
access and interconnection obligations of LECs, as long as they are
not inconsistent with the goals of the TA96.38
To introduce competition for local telephone service, the
TA96 created a, hierarchy of duties for different types of
telecommunications carriers. First, the TA96 restates the general
duty of all telecommunications carriers to interconnect with the
facilities and equipment of all other telecommunications carriers.39
This interconnection requirement protects the ease of access of the
entire national telecommunications network to all carriers.
Second, the TA96 creates additional duties for all LECs - both
31. Id. at § 48 (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11).
32. See Harris & Kraft, supra n. 21, at 95.
33. See 110 Stat. at 56.
34. The United States Supreme Court has observed that the states must hew to the
lines drawn by the statute. See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 378 n. 6. Furthermore, some
commentators have argued that the FCC's policies have attempted to thwart this dual
jurisdiction by limiting state discretion too much. See e.g. Jerry A. Hausman & J.G. Sidak,
A Consumer Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications
Networks, 109 Yale L.J. 417, 500-03 (1999).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
36. Id. § 253(d).
37. Id. § 252(d) & (e).
38. Id. § 251(d)(3).
39. Id. § 251(a). Prior to the TA96, the same obligation existed. See id. § 201 (1994).
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ILECs and CLECs. All LECs have five obligations:40 (1) to provide
non-discriminatory service to resellers of telecommunications
services provided by the LEC; (2) to permit number portability;41 (3)
to provide dialing parity;42 (4) to afford access to any right-of-way the
LEC may control; and (5) to provide reciprocal compensation "for
the transport and termination of telecommunications., 43 These LEC
provisions encourage competition by ensuring that customers can
both access other LEC providers via the local loop as well as switch
between providers without incurring the inconvenience of having to
change telephone numbers. The provisions also encourage new forms
of competition by allowing LECs to resell services provided by other
LECs. The reciprocal compensation provision ensures that the costs
of terminating the traffic of another LEC are recovered through
reciprocal - but not necessarily equal - charges for the transport
and termination of traffic. Finally, the provision granting any LEC
access to another LEC's right-of-way encourages facilities-based
competition, since other LECs may build competing networks along
these rights-of-way without having to secure legal assurance for
another, parallel right-of-way.
Third, Congress mandated a set of special duties for ILECs in
addition to complying with the duties for all LECs.44 The ILEC has
special obligations to provide interconnection services to any
competitor to route and transmit telephone exchange service at any
technically feasible point within the network.4 ' The TA96 mandates
40. See id. § 251.
41. Congress has defined number portability as the ability of a telephone customer
to "move" his or her number when changing to another LEC. H.R. Rpt. 104-204, at 72
(July 24, 1995) (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 37).
42. Congress referred to dialing parity as the ability to dial the same number of
digits to reach another number, regardless of who is providing the service. See id.
(reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 38).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b).
44. The TA96 defines ILECs as carriers who provided local exchange service on
February 8, 1996. 47 U.S.C. § 251(h)(1). The TA96 permits the FCC to designate
additional LECs as ILECs in the future if three conditions are met: (1) the market
position of the LEC is comparable to that of an ILEC defined in 47 U.S.C. § 251(h)(1);
(2) the LEC has displaced the previously designated ILEC; and (3) the designation is
"consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity and the purposes of this
section." Id. § 251(h)(2). The TA96 also provides certain exemptions to LECs that
otherwise would be classified as ILECs. Most notably, the TA96 exempts rural exchange
carriers and local exchange providers that control fewer than two percent of the country's
subscriber lines. Id. § 251(f). A great deal of legal controversy has brewed with respect to
the legal standards satisfying the rural exemption. See Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 759-62.
45. See 47 U.S.C § 251(c)(2)(A) & (B). Greive and Levin discuss the ambiguity of
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that the ILEC provide interconnection to CLECs "that is at least
equal in quality"' 6 to that provided by the ILEC "on rates, terms, and
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 4 7 In
addition to interconnection, the TA96 requires ILECs to: (1)
unbundle components of the network (UNEs) and lease them to
competitors;4 (2) provide physical collocation of CLEC equipment
that is necessary to interconnect with the ILEC on its premises;49 and
(3) offer retail services for resale at a wholesale discount.50
The unbundling provision allows CLECs to use discrete parts of
an ILEC's network and facilities without incurring the costs of using
the other portions of the network. The CLEC can use a combination
of its own facilities and the ILEC's facilities to create its own
competing network that provides service to subscribers. FCC
regulations originally identified seven general network elements to
be unbundled.' The seven network elements encompass the
following:
a) Loop and Subloop
1) Local loop
2) Subloop (any part of the loop that can be accessed
through terminals in the ILEC's outside plant)
3) Line conditioning (removal from loop of devices that
may diminish high-speed capability), attached
electronics, 2 and high capacity loops
4) Dark fiber5
this requirement as it relates to unbundling requirements. See Willie Grieve & Stanford
Levin, Telecom Competition in Canada and the U.S.: The Tortoise and the Hare (1997)
(Twenty-Fifth Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Sept. 27-29,
1997, unpublished manuscript presented at the conference, and on file with the authors).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(C).
47. Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
48. Id. § 251(c)(3).
49. See id. § 251(c)(6) (Virtual collocation is permitted when actual collocation is
infeasible as a technical matter, such as limited space at the relevant network facility.).
50. Id. § 251(c)(4).
51. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.319 (1999).
52. In re Implementation of the Loc. Competition Provisions of the Telecomm. Act of
1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, at 175 (1998) (The Commission states, "[W]e conclude that,
with the exception of Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers (DSLAMs), the loop
includes attached electronics, including multiplexing equipment used to derive the loop
transmission capacity.").
53. Id. at 176.
54. Dark fiber is listed in the description of both loops and interoffice facilities
UNEs. See id. at § II, Executive Summary. With respect to loops, the FCC did not specify
[23:751
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b) Network Interface Device
c) Switching Capability
1) Local switching capability55 (exception to unbundling
in certain higher density zones when other
requirements met)
2) Local tandem switching
3) Packet switching56
d) Interoffice Transmission Facilities (includes dedicated
transport, dark fiber, shared transport)
e) Signaling Networks and Call-Related Databases
1) Signaling networks (when CLEC purchases switching,
or to CLEC with switching capabilities) ,
2) Call related databases (including access to emergency
911, line information, and other databases)
3) Service management systems (databases and systems
for call processing)
4) Operator Services and Directory Assistance (only
required in the absence of customized routing or
compatible signaling protocol)
5) Operations Support Systems
The FCC also required that ILECs "share" the high-speed
frequency of the loop with CLECs.57 The FCC maintains that this
will enable competitive carriers to provide Digital Subscriber Line
("DSL")-based services over the same telephone lines
simultaneously used by incumbent LECs to provide basic telephone
service. 8
With respect to the collocation provision, the TA96 requires an
ILEC to grant access to a LEC competitor of "such public switched
facilities and functions as may be requested ... for the purpose of
whether dark fiber was included or excluded from the definition of the loop in its original
interpretation of the TA96. See id. at IT1 162, 166. The FCC has explicitly added this
element as part of the loop. See id. at T 174, 196. The FCC has permitted states to
reasonably restrict complete unbundled access to dark fiber. See id. at 199.
55. This includes all features that the switch is capable of: white page listing,
telephone number, local area signaling, and service features such as Centrex.
56. A required element where the ILEC has deployed digital loop carrier systems,
and the ILEC has not permitted CLEC to deploy DSL Access Multiplexer at the remote
terminal, and the ILEC has deployed packet switching for its own use.
57. In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (1999).
58. Federal Communications Commission, Federal Communications Commission
Action to Accelerate Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Services for
Residential and Small Business Consumers (News Release, Nov. 18, 1999).
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enabling... [the LEC] to provide telecommunications services. '59
Finally, the resale provision permits CLECs greater ease in
offering services they cannot provide independently. While all LECs
have the duty to offer retail services for resale, ILECs have the
additional duty to offer for resale, at wholesale rates, "any
telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to
subscribers." 6 Congress has defined the wholesale rate as the retail
rate charged to subscribers less "any marketing, billing, collection,
and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier.,
61
Crafting the regulations governing the pricing mechanisms are
critical to effectively implement the UNE, interconnection and
collocation provisions of the TA96 and attain the goal of encouraging
efficient competitive behavior. Congress has created guidelines for a
general pricing standard for states and the FCC to follow in
implementing these aspects of the TA96. 2 With respect to both
interconnection and UNEs, the TA96 requires that ILEC "rates,
terms, and conditions" for usage be "just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory., 63 Like the interconnection and UNE provisions,
collocation rates and other terms should be nondiscriminatory. ' The
costs of providing interconnection and UNEs are the bases for
developing their prices. 6' These prices may include a reasonable
profit for the ILEC.66 The statute, however, leaves regulators with the
task of implementing the specific pricing methodology to satisfy the
requirements of these guidelines.
To fill the statutory void, the FCC adopted a uniform pricing
methodology for interconnection, UNEs, and collocation.67 The FCC
initially adopted a methodology that it dubbed "Total Element Long
Run Incremental Cost," or TELRIC.68 We briefly describe TELRIC
59. 47 U.S.C. § 259 (1996).
60. Id. § 251(c)(4)(A). However, a state regulatory commission may prevent the
reseller from offering the services to a different class of customers than the ILEC had
provided. See id. at § 251(c)(4)(B).
61. Id. § 252(d)(3).
61. See id. § 251.
63. Id. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3).
64. See id.
65. See id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).
66. See id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(ii), (B).
67. See In re First Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, at $ 626 (1996) [hereinafter First
Report and Order].
68. See id. at 672.
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here. 9 The TELRIC approach establishes cost by measuring long run
incremental costs plus some allocation of forward-looking joint and
common costs.70 Furthermore, by using long-run costs as a basis, all
costs associated with the network are considered avoidable.71
Under TELRIC, the price for a specific network element is
calculated by adding: (1) the long run incremental costs associated
with that element; and (2) some portion of unattributable, forward-
looking, joint and common costs to the network, including a
reasonable return on investment.72 These figures are used to estimate
the cost of constructing an entirely new, hypothetical network. This
hypothetical network relies on the existing location of the ILEC's
switching centers and uses the most efficient technology available in
the telecommunications industry regardless of the technology the
ILEC actually uses for itself and furnishes to the CLEC.
73
The Eighth Circuit recently rejected the FCC's TELRIC method
of costing and pricing.7' The court reasoned that because TELRIC
relied on the cost structure of a hypothetical network that maintained
all of the newest available technology, it violated the statutory
requirement that rates be "based on the cost ... of providing the
interconnection or network element., 75 The court concluded that this
language suggested that Congress sought to implement a pricing
method that relies on actual costs, not on the cost some imaginary
carrier would incur by providing the newest, most efficient, and least
costly substitute for the actual item or element which will be
furnished by the existing ILEC pursuant to Congress's mandate for
sharing. 6
Congress required ILECs to share their existing facilities and
equipment with new competitors to bring competition to local
telephone service. It expressly said that the ILECs' costs of providing
those facilities and equipment were to be recoverable through just
69. A more detailed discussion is found in infra Part 111(B).
70. See First Report and Order, supra n. 67, at 675.
71. See id. at 677.
72. See id. at 672-673.
73. See id. at 685; see also Harris & Kraft, supra n. 21, at 104 ("The TELRIC
approach calls for estimating the cost of reconstructing an entire, hypothetical network
using the best available forward-looking technology. TELRIC holds constant only the
company's existing switch locations and thus, effectively allows all capital expenses to be
treated as variable costs.").
73. See Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750-52.
75. Id. at 750.
76. Id. at 750-52 (citation omitted).
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and reasonable rates.77 According to the court, Congress did not
expect a new competitor to pay rates for a "reconstructed local
network," but for the existing local network it would be using in an
attempt to compete." Since the CLEC "piggybacks" onto the ILEC's
network, the statute permits the ILEC to recoup the cost of providing
that ride. 9
In requiring ILECs to provide UNEs to CLECs, Congress treats
the local loop and other facilities as if those facilities were essential
for entry. Some ILECs had argued before the United States
Supreme Court that the TA96 was simply Congress' restatement of
the common law antitrust principles of the essential facilities
doctrine.8 ° Had this been the case, Congress would not have needed
to create a whole new body of regulations to identify and price these
services.8' It could have simply eliminated entry barriers and barred
state regulation of pricing, leaving to the courts and government
antitrust authorities the enforcement of the antitrust laws, as is the
case for most other industries.82 Alternatively, Congress could have
77. 47 U.S.C. § 251.
78. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 751.
80. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 388. Section 251(d)(2) sets out the legal requirements
to access ILEC UNEs:
(2) Access standards. - In determining what network elements
should be made available for purposes of subsection (c)(3)
[unbundling], the Commission shall consider, at a minimum, whether
- (A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is
necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access to such network
elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier
seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer. U.S.C. §
251(d)(2) (emphasis added).
Notably, the FCC's First Report and Order, supra n. 67, mentions the term
"essential facilities" once in 700 pages and the term is not used as a standard for
determining which incumbent's facilities should be subject to mandatory unbundling. In
vacating the FCC's initial unbundling requirements, the United States Supreme Court did
not direct the FCC to employ the essential facilities doctrine. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at
389.
81. Cf. John T. Soma, et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated
Telecommunications Industry, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 565, 609-10 (1998) (arguing that
regulators could apply the essential facilities doctrine to the TA96 without violating the
language and goals of the statute).
82. The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice do maintain
antitrust jurisdiction over several aspects of the telecommunications industry. For
example, the agencies ultimately have jurisdiction to evaluate the competitive effects of
mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996).
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explicitly sought to emulate the antitrust laws through the regulatory
process. For example, Canadian regulators have adopted
telecommunications reforms that hew closer to the essential facilities
doctrine. 3
This institutional choice deserves some brief comment. In
enacting the TA96, Congress may have sought a uniform solution to
the competitive issues with respect to ILECs. Through FCC and
federal statutory guidelines, a large number of competitive issues
could be addressed uniformly. Under the auspices of the courts and
federal antitrust enforcers, these issues may have reached different
resolutions depending on the court and other circumstances.'
The common law of the essential facilities doctrine might evolve
in unpredictable ways to handle these new cases. A legislative
approach also prevents CLECs from incurring larger, individualized
litigation expenses before they could even gain interconnection or the
UNEs that the TA96 provides. Incumbents may initiate litigation to
cause other new entrants to incur disproportionate expenses in
responding to a law suit, forestalling or entirely precluding entry."
Moreover, the reaches of the essential facilities doctrine are
83. See Loc. Competition Decision, at IT 66-126 (Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecomm. Commn, May 1, 1997). Unbundling occurs only for those network components
that are essential facilities. Three criteria are required to satisfy the essential facility
requirement: (1) the network is monopoly controlled; (2) a CLEC needs the network
element to provide services; and (3) a CLEC cannot duplicate the network element
economically or technically. See id. at 1 74; see also Grieve & Levin, supra n. 45; Willie
Greive & John Lowe, Canada, International Telecommunications Law (BNA Intl. 1999).
84. Some economists have advocated a case-by-case examination. But such an
approach could be quite onerous and could require states to take part in the process. See
Hausman & Sidak, supra n. 34, at 500-01.
85. Robert Bork suggests that litigation can be used as a predatory tool. An
incumbent's use of litigation can create costs that are disproportionately borne by new
entrants who may have more limited resources than their entrenched rivals. Even when
the entrant is a relatively large firm with significant resources, litigation still acts as a
conduit for forestalling competition, extending monopoly rents. Those rents may be
relatively large in comparison to the costs of litigation. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 347-64 (Basic Books 1978).
The difficulty with Bork's theory, however, is that an incumbent may also seek access
to the courts to prosecute other, more legitimate aims, such as avoiding burdensome
regulations. As a result, such litigation is typically protected under the First Amendment
unless it is a sham calculated to simply violate the antitrust laws. See E. R.R. Pres. Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In addition, less regulated competitors
may use litigation and the regulatory process to stall relaxed regulation for incumbents.
New entrants may therefore also attempt to use the courts and the regulatory process to
their advantage.
20011 PRICING NETWORK ELEMENTS
more limited than the TA96. 6 Commentators have noted that the
doctrine is rarely used for three practical reasons.87 First, with liberal
access, firms may avoid making significant investments in their own
facilities and instead rely on the investments of their rivals. Second,
liberal access discourages firms from making riskier, innovative
investments. Firms will be unable to reap the benefits of being a
"first-mover" since their rivals will be able to access the new facility.8
Third, in mandating access, a court must act like a regulator in setting
reasonable terms and conditions to facilitate competition. Setting
rates too high will preserve the monopolist's control of the market,
while setting rates too low will cause less investment in the facility
and create more entry without facilities-based investment than an
efficient market would encourage.
As a result, the threshold for prevailing under the essential
facilities doctrine is rather high. 9 Courts have established four legal
requirements: (1) control of the facility by a monopolist; (2) an
inability of a competitor to replicate the facility in a reasonable
manner; (3) the monopolist's denial of use of its facility to rivals; and
(4) technical feasibility of opening access to the facility to rivals.'
Thus, a competitor's need for the facility must be essential for entry.
Without it, the competitor would be unable to be in business. 91
86. Hausman and Sidak observe that the doctrine "has shown the capacity to screen
out a multitude of unmeritorious claims." See Hausman & Sidak, supra n. 34, at 467. They
contend that the FCC's application of the TA96 would allow greater access to UNEs than
the essential facilities doctrine. See id. According to them, this result is dubious because
the FCC's belief "that the public interest is advanced by the simplistic rule that any
compulsory sharing that is technically feasible should be required" is doubtful. Id.
87. Soma, et al., supra n. 77, at 581-82. Arguably, the United States Supreme Court
has addressed the essential facilities doctrine on four occasions. See Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S.
366 (1973); Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945); U.S. v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 224
U.S. 383 (1897).
88. AT&T has argued that it should not have to provide access to its cable
television facilities to competitors for similar reasons. See C. Michael Armstrong, Speech,
Telecom and Cable TV: Shared Prospect for the Communications Future (Washington
Metropolitan Cable Club, Nov. 2, 1998) (available at <http://www.att.com/speeches/
item/0,1363,948,00.html>).
89. For example, courts have rejected the essential facilities doctrine for shippers
who are captive to one railroad where the shippers wished to gain access to the tracks to
operate their own trains and interchange with other railroads. See e.g. Laurel Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1991); Bar Technologies Inc. v.
Conemaugh & Black Lick R.R. Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Penn. 1999).
90. See e.g. MCI Commun. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081,1132-
33 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Hausman & Sidak, supra n. 34, at 467.
91. See e.g. Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, liA § 771c, at
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Nonetheless, a court may still find aspects of a local network an
essential facility. In MCI Communications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph, the Seventh Circuit upheld a jury's finding
that AT&T's local facilities were essential facilities that MCI needed
to provide for certain forms of long distance telephone service.92 The
court explained:
AT&T had complete control over the local distribution
facilities that MCI required. The interconnections were
essential for MCI to offer ... [certain long distance]
service[s]. The facilities in question met the criteria of
"essential facilities" in that MCI could not duplicate Bell's
local facilities. Given present technology, local telephone
service is generally regarded as a natural monopoly and is
regulated as such. It would not be economically feasible for
MCI to duplicate Bell's local distribution facilities
(involving millions of miles of cable and line to individual
homes and businesses), and regulatory authorization could
not be obtained for such an uneconomical duplication.93
What is striking, however, about MCI is that technical progress
in the telecommunications industry has significantly changed the
circumstances on which its legal conclusions were based in 1982.
Indeed, several commentators have suggested that an ILEC's
facilities would not satisfy the doctrine's requirements, in that the
local loop itself may not be an essential facility necessary for entry
into the telecommunications business:
Although the ILEC is a monopolist of copper telephone
lines, the essential facilities doctrine is not premised upon a
copper telephone line monopoly. ... If cellular, fiber-optic,
cable, and satellite technologies effectively compete with
the copper telephone line, the ownership of copper
telephone lines would not be central to the provision of
telephone service within the relevant market. Possession of
a copper telephone line monopoly would also not be central
to competitive viability if: (1) the copper telephone lines are
available from another source; (2) copper telephone lines
are easily duplicable by a competitor; or (3) other
technology provides an equivalent substitute. Allowing
access to copper telephone lines within the confines of these
divisions enables a competitor to simply substitute itself for
176-77 (Little Brown1996).
92. 708 F.2d at 1133.
93. Id.
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the incumbent local exchange provider. This substitution
creates few (if any) pro-competitive effects and has the
potential of chilling desirable behavior.94
Other networks, such as cable television, may represent parallel
networks that could compete with a local loop." Moreover, other
technologies, such as wireless telephony, may simply bypass the local
loop entirely.96
III
Analysis of Cost Principles
for Unbundled Network Elements
This section examines the three basic costing approaches that
could be employed to establish the cost of an UNE. We first examine
an approach that incorporates embedded cost. Second, we examine
the FCC's TELRIC approach. Third, we consider our "back to the
future" approach. In the fourth section, we demonstrate that the
"back to the future" approach satisfies the policy goals and legal
requirements of the TA96, as well as more closely reflecting efficient
market behavior.
Before evaluating the three cost approaches in detail, we raise
an important distinction: "cost" and "price" are two very distinct and
different concepts. The FCC's TELRIC method illustrates the
potential confusion with these concepts. The FCC has recommended
the development of a total service long-run incremental cost of a
network element through TELRIC. The TELRIC price is the sum of
TELRIC plus a reasonable allocation of forward-looking joint and
common costs. Thus, TELRIC hinges on two concepts: one is a cost
94. Soma, et al., supra n. 77, at 598-599; see also Harris & Kraft, supra n. 21, at 98-
102 (noting alternative technologies for entry for CLECs, including satellite based
technologies, cellular and cable); Hausman & Sidak, supra n. 34, at 488-89 (arguing a case
by case analysis of whether the local loop is indeed an essential facility); Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 Yale J. Reg. 25, 34 (1995) (arguing that
telecommunications networks are no longer natural monopolies).
95. Spulber, supra n. 94, at 39 (noting that "a high proportion of households has
both standard telephone service and cable telecommunications services").
96. The growth of wireless telephone use has been dramatic. Cellular telephone
subscribers in the United States grew from approximately 5.3 million in 1990 to 86 million
in 1999. See Lawrence Rout, Innovation and Technology: A Statistical Look at the Roots
- and Fruits - of Technological Advances Around the World, W.S.J. R6 (Sept. 25, 2000);
see also Federal Communications Commission, Trends in Telephone Service 92 (available
at <http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/stats>) (Dec. 2000) (estimating 101 million wireless
subscribers).
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concept and the other a pricing formula. The pricing aspect of
TELRIC relates to the recovery of shared, joint and common costs
that telecommunications firms incur in providing different services.
Many economists have criticized pricing schemes that simply
allocate shared, joint and common costs as arbitrary and unlikely to
lead to economically efficient prices.97 Efficient pricing principles for
joint and common costs require both cost information and market
information.98 In contrast to this approach, the FCC has required
97. See e.g. William J. Baumol, Superfairness 134-36 (M.I.T. Press1986); William J.
Baumol et al., How Arbitrary is 'Arbitrary'? or, Toward the Deserved Demise of Full Cost
Allocation, Pub. Util. Fort., Sept. 3, 1987, at 16; James C. Bonbright et al., Principles of
Public Utility Rates 481 (2d ed. 1988); Ronald Braeutigam, An Analysis of Fully
Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated Industries, 11 Bell J. Econ. 182 (1980); Ronald H.
Coase, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application, 1 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt.
Sci. 113 (1970); Paul J. Garfield & Wallace F. Lovejoy, Public Utility Economics 140-41
(1964); Alfred E. Kahn, Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation 70-73
(1989); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 Yale J.
Reg. 150 (1990); David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in
Telecommunications: Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11
Yale J. on Reg. 119 (1994); Alexander C. Larson, Cost Allocations, Predation, and
Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications, 14 J. Corp. L. 377 (1989); Walter B. McFarland,
Concepts For Management Accounting 46 (Natl. Assoc. of Accountants1966); Dudley F.
Pegrum, Public Regulation of Business 194-98 (Irwinl965); Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The
Economics of Regulation 157-61 (1969); George Sweeney, Welfare Implications of Fully
Distributed Cost Pricing Applied to Partially Regulated Firms, 13 Bell J. Econ. 525
(Irwin1982); Haskell P. Wald, The Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing and Utility Rates, Pub.
Util. Fort., 15 (June 22, 1967); Arthur L. Thomas, The Allocation Problem: Part Two 156-
57 (Am. Acctg. Assoc.1974); John T. Wenders, The Economics of Telecommunications:
Theory and Policy 174 (1987).
98. Three economic pricing standards are relevant for establishing an appropriate
pricing methodology. First, the price of a service should be no greater than its stand-alone
cost. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 Am.
Econ. Rev. 966, 974-76 (1975); Parsons, supra n. 18, at 161. The FCC has recognized this
principle in its rules governing UNEs, noting that "[tihe sum of a reasonable allocation of
forward-looking common costs and the total element long-run incremental cost of an
element shall not exceed the stand-alone costs associated with the element." 47 C.F.R.
§ 51.505 (c)(2).
Second, the prices to recover for joint and common costs should be efficient.
Establishing efficient prices for the recovery of joint and common costs is rather difficult.
Pricing at marginal cost for all services leaves the shared and common costs of the firm
unrecovered. Such pricing is unsustainable, causing firms to exit, and is therefore not
efficient in a dynamic sense. Prices can diverge from marginal costs in second-best fashion
via multipart tariffs or Ramsey-efficient pricing. See e.g. Alfred E. Kahn & William B.
Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 191,
248 n. 142 (1987); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Competition in
Telecommunications 61-83, 114-16, 131-36 (2000); Charles H. Kennedy, An Introduction
to U.S. Telecommunications Law 146-47 (Artech House1994); Bonbright et al., supra n.
97, at 426; William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost
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TELRIC prices to reflect only cost information to the exclusion of
market information.99
Our discussion emphasizes the first aspect of the FCC's TELRIC
price - estimating the direct costs attributable to an UNE.
Recognizing the unclear economic impact of various approaches to
estimating the joint and common costs, we defer discussing the merits
of the FCC's approach, and the alternatives, for another day. Instead,
we focus on how to best estimate the costs directly attributable to
UNEs or other specific services.
A. Looking Backward in Time: Embedded Costs
When the debate establishing the appropriate costs associated
with ILEC networks occurred before the FCC, a number of ILECs
contended that the costing methodology should include the historical
expenses that were incurred in building the network."° These costs
reflect the embedded expenditures in the ILEC's network, and a
proportion of these costs may be "sunk" (at least in some sense) since
there may be no alternative use for the facilities.'' Moreover,
because of the prior regulatory regime, the mix of technology and
network attributes probably would not have reflected competitive
forces of the market. Such costs may be sunk or stranded because
[u]nder regulation, the incumbent LEC invested in facilities
to perform its obligation to serve and to achieve regulatory
objectives, including the provision of universal service. The
Pricing, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 265 (1970).
Third, a proper relationship between retail and wholesale prices should be
established. One standard, albeit controversial, is the efficient components pricing rule
("ECPR"). The FCC has rejected this particular approach. See First Report and Order,
supra n. 63, at 1 709 ("We conclude that ECPR is an improper method for setting prices
of interconnection and unbundled network elements because the existing retail prices that
would be used to compute incremental opportunity costs under ECPR are not cost-
based.").
99. See First Report and Order, supra n. 66, at 696.
100. Id. at 704.
101. Unfortunately, "sunk costs" has come to have two meanings. First, from a
public policy or societal perspective, a cost may be sunk if the facilities can only be used
for one specific purpose (e.g., providing local telecommunications service). Second, from
the perspective of the firm, the costs are only sunk if there is no market value to their
alternate use. To the firm, if the assets can be sold to another firm that would use them
for the same purpose, the costs are not sunk. However, in some instances, regulation itself
may constrain a firm's ability to sell assets and/or regulation will constrain the purchaser
in the use of the assets. In addition, discussion of sunk costs and stranded costs become
difficult since only some portion of the costs may be sunk or stranded.
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possibility of stranded costs, as regulators permit
competition in the market for local telephony, indicates that
such investment may not have been economically efficient
- that is, the incremental benefits to consumers may not
exceed the incremental costs of the investment. Through
prudency reviews and used and useful tests, regulators
attempted to guard against inefficient investment that did
not satisfy regulatory criteria. Those safeguards, however,
were significantly different from a full test of economic
efficiency.1°2
Under this rationale, the new competition in local telephony
leaves the ILECs with past inefficient investments that should be
recovered through a backward-looking costing methodology for
UNEs and other forms of network access. According to Sidak and
Spulber, the existence of less efficient network components and
related investments was a holdover from a regulatory contract
between the ILEC and state and federal regulators. 3 In a sense, they
suggest the government must uphold that contract by including
compensation for these past costs. To the extent ILECs remain
uncompensated or undercompensated, they would have disincentives
to make future investments in the network infrastructure. In their
own words, "[i]f deprived of a return to capital facilities after capital
has been sunk in irreversible investments, or if faced with reduced
returns to investments already made, any economically rational
company will eliminate or reduce similar capital investments in the
future."1"
At least one commentator has extended the concept of a
regulatory contract by finding that in the face of facilities-based
competition, the incumbent incurs costs associated with the option
(but not the obligation) of the customer to use the incumbent's
102. J.G. Sidak & Daniel P. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in
Network Industries, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 117, 120-21 (1998).
103. See William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings and Breach
of the Regulatory Contract, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037 (1997).
104. Sidak & Spulber, supra n. 102, at 124-25; but see Jim Chen, Standing in the
Shadows of Giants: The Role of Intergenerational Equity in Telecommunications Reform,
71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 921, 936 (2000). Sidak and Spulber also argue that failure to
compensate the ILECs for these stranded costs violates the Takings Clause of the
Constitution. See J.G. Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 851, 933 (1996). We do not address this issue as
several commentators have discussed it. See e.g. Baumol & Merrill, supra n. 103; David
Gabel & David I. Rosenbaum, Who's Taking Whom: Some Comments and Evidence on
the Constitutionality of TELRIC, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 239, 266 (2000); Chen, supra n. 103.
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facilities.' 5 To equalize this regulatory burden, Weisman has
endorsed a "default capacity tariff.''° The tariff would be calculated
to pay for the costs associated with the option to use facilities that are
provided as part of the regulatory contract."
The FCC has rejected the inclusion of embedded costs in its cost
formula, concluding that a pro-competitive policy requires an
approach to costing that is forward looking.' 8 The FCC reasoned that
such an embedded costing system would interfere with the
development of efficient competition." With regard to the specific
calculation of costs, we agree. However, as noted above, we caution
that the calculation of forward-looking costs and the determination
of prices, which includes the assignment of joint and common costs,
are two different exercises."0 In pricing and cost recovery, historical
information has greater relevance.
But, in many instances, historical expenditures either
overestimate or underestimate the costs that firms will actually incur
in the future."' Two illustrations show the divergence historical
expenditures may have with costs that will actually be incurred in the
future. In the case of capitalized labor - e.g., trenching, splicing, and
erecting poles and other structures - historical expenditures are
likely to understate the current market value of the assets. Pricing on
the basis of historical expenditures for such assets would lead to
inefficiently low UNE prices. In contrast, historical expenditures for
switching equipment and other electronics are likely to overstate the
market value of such assets. In these instances, using historical
information could lead to inefficiently high UNE prices. CLECs
would be unable to take advantage of the cost savings that have
105. Dennis L. Weisman, Default Capacity Tariffs: Smoothing the Transitional
Regulatory Asymmetries in the Telecommunications Market, 5 Yale S. on Reg. 149 (1988);
see also Dennis L. Weisman, Competitive Markets and Carriers of Last Resort, Pub. Util.
Fort. 17 (Jul. 6, 1989).
106. Id.
107. Weisman, supra n. 100 (describing the implied contract, or franchise obligation
facing local telephone companies, and a recommended tariff to deal with costs sunk due
to competitive entry).
108. First Report and Order, supra n. 67, at T 705; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d)(1) (1999).
109. Id. at '1 706.
110. See supra Part III and accompanying text.
111. Generally, directly attributable incremental costs establish the lower bound for
pricing in competitive markets. See Richard Emmerson & Steve G. Parsons, Dangers of
Cost-Based Pricing, 8 J. Prof. Pricing 21, 21-25 (1999). The degree to which historical
investments are recovered depends on market conditions. While firms will recover their
historical investments on average, this result is not assured for each firm.
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occurred from technical advances in telecommunications electronics
without making the investments themselves.
Attempts to incorporate historical costs in a cost-based
calculation of prices have inherent dangers. Such historical-cost
pricing mechanisms are conceptually similar to traditional rate-of-
return regulation mechanisms that are generally regarded to create
incentives inferior to price cap mechanisms."' ILECs themselves may
have incentives to extend the life of stranded facilities in order to
continue to obtain "recovery" from them. If this leads to higher
prices for UNEs, UNE-based entry would be deterred at the margin
where the higher prices would reduce the CLEC's anticipated return
from such entry."' In short, the embedded approach to costing would
slow UNE-based entry until these past regulatory costs are fully
compensated.
B. Looking Forward Without Turning Back - TELRIC
If one elects not to look backward to derive costs, one can
instead look forward, as the FCC elected to do when it adopted
TELRIC. TELRIC is a variant of the total service long-run
incremental cost ("TSLRIC"). 4 TSLRIC and TELRIC are both
forward-looking in nature. " '
The primary distinction between TSLRIC and TELRIC is that
TSLRIC refers to the costs of services purchased by customers, such
as local service and long distance services, while TELRIC refers to
the costs of the network elements that are used to provide the
services, like local loops, switching, and interoffice transmission
facilities.11 6 The FCC has previously utilized TSLRIC to determine if
a service receives a cross-subsidy. "7
112. See generally Donald Kridel, et al., The Effects of Incentive Regulation in the
Telecommunications Industry: A Survey, 9 J. Reg. Econ. 269-306 (1996).
113. Such pricing may comparatively encourage facilities-based entry.
114. TELRIC is the FCC's own application of TSLRIC. See First Report and Order,
supra n. 67, at 11 672-673, 678.
115. See id. at 1 672.
116. See First Report and Order, supra n. 66, at I 672-685.
117. However, Sidak and Spulber explain that TSLRIC cannot be used to set prices
alone:
[Setting prices to TSLRIC] does not allow prices to be adjusted in
response to competition. Regulators should not adopt TSLRIC pricing
to pursue a mistaken representation of how markets operate. Instead,
regulators should let competition determine the margins on
unbundled services. TSLRIC pricing, by automatically eliminating all
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TELRIC represents the forward-looking costs of the most
efficient technologies for the entire quantity of network elements
needed to serve expected demand."' Because TELRIC represents
long run costs, it is assumed no sunk inputs are used to provide the
network elements." 9 All inputs required to provide the service are
variable, and therefore, all components necessary to provide a
network element must have an associated cost.1
20
TELRIC is premised on a common, but incorrect, interpretation
of forward-looking economic costs. TELRIC measures the costs of a
hypothetical market entrant who can instantaneously construct a
least-cost network to provide the full array of services currently
provided by the ILEC.'2' Moreover, under the TELRIC approach, the
entrant is assumed to incur no sunk investment and therefore is not
constrained by past decisions regarding its investments or operations.
The entrant starts with a "blank slate" and instantaneously constructs
a network with the capacity to accommodate all of the incumbent's
customers. 22 In effect, the FCC's TELRIC approach conceptually
tears down or completely ignores the existing ILEC network and
replaces it with a new, hypothetical network.
While TELRIC's forward looking approach to cost avoids the
pitfalls of including stranded costs that would likely overcompensate
ILECs, it too is conceptually flawed. The FCC's interpretation of the
efficient entrant (and the appropriate metric on which to base
forward-looking economic costs) represents an unattainable static
ideal, rather than the achievable performance of an efficient
incumbent or entrant in the real world. Actual incumbents or
entrants will generally deviate from this hypothetical static standard
margins, leaves the incumbent LEC no room for competitive price
adjustment and thus creates a competitive disadvantage relative to
new entrants.
J.G. Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of
Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 1081, 1156-57 (1997).
118. See First Report and Order, supra n. 67, at 677, 685, 690; see also Iowa Util.
Bd. 219 F.3d at 749-50.
119. Id. at 677 ("The term 'long run,' in the context of 'long run incremental cost,'
refers to a period long enough so that all of a firm's costs become variable or
avoidable.").
120. See id. at 691.
121. See Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 749-50.
122. Alfred Kahn was the first to employ the term "blank slate" to refer to such
hypothetical cost constructs. See Kahn, Letting Go, supra n. 97, at 89-103.
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for three reasons: (1) economies of scale for some
telecommunications investments in combination with growth in
demand over time; (2) the rapid rate of technological change; and (3)
the economic uncertainty that all firms face in regarding future
investments and demand for those investments.
First, economies of scale for some telecommunications
investments, in combination with continued growth in demand over
time, lead to important cost characteristics. Growth in
telecommunications demand over time will tend to lead to
incremental investment over time, rather than a single placement of
facilities for all future customers. Because economies of scale exist
for some telecommunications investments, the sum of the actual
incremental investments will be greater than the TELRIC
hypothetical instantaneous investment to serve the current demand.
Similarly, a perfectly sized, least-cost network today is likely to be
insufficient in the future as demand for telecommunications
continues to grow. This would hold true even if future growth in
demand were certain.
A new firm, unencumbered with the franchise obligation to
serve all customers at the time they demand service, would not
instantaneously develop a perfectly sized network with the latest
technology to serve all customers. New entrants are likely to serve a
market on an incremental basis, perhaps waiting until demand
reaches a critical threshold before constructing any facilities. Capital
investments occur over a span of time and face practical limitations,
such as minimizing service disruptions.
Second, technological change in the industry also creates
situations where the incumbent carrier provides services using a mix
of technologies. In contrast, the hypothetical statically efficient
entrant who instantaneously creates a new network will employ only
new technology. No real world analogy of this model exists. As Kahn
has stated, "In a world of continuous technological progress, it would
be irrational for firms to constantly update their facilities in order to
completely incorporate today's lowest-cost technology as though
starting from scratch... [I]nvestments made today, totally embodying
the most modern technology would be outdated tomorrow."'23
It obviously would not be cost effective for the incumbent to
replace all of its plant as each new technology becomes available.
Rather, the incumbent makes an economic comparison between
continued use of the previously installed older technology and the
123. Id. at 91.
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installation and use of the new technology. At the point where the
new technology becomes cost effective, the incumbent begins the
process of replacing the older plant with the new technology.
However, this change is not instantaneous; it occurs at an
economically feasible rate for the incumbent.124 Additionally, once a
facilities-based entrant is in the market, it also faces the same type of
constraints in adopting new technologies. Unregulated firms are
unlikely to deploy the latest technology everywhere simultaneously.
An unregulated firm may employ its newest technology for its most
profitable operations, such as in dense urban areas or areas where
other economic reasons dictate that choice of technology. It may then
later expand into other territories.
125
Third, uncertainty with respect to future economic conditions for
a dynamically efficient firm does not comport with TELRIC. In an
industry with high fixed costs and rapid technological change, the
assumption of static efficiency imposes significant revenue recovery
risk upon incumbent firms.
Investments must be made based on expectations of customer
demand, input prices, and available technologies. Once investments
are made, actual customer demands, input prices, and technologies
will vary from prior expectations due to uncertainty. Thus, optimal
investment based on prior expectations will deviate from optimality
after the investments are made. An actual firm, whether it is an
incumbent or an entrant, may be efficient in a dynamic sense but not
efficient in the idealized, static sense.
In reality, a firm assesses expected growth in demand for its
services with its capacity to serve demand, based on its current
capacity and any additions that may be required. Moreover, the
timing of capacity additions will be determined by the timing of
expected demand growth and the timing of the need for additional
capacity relative to the carrying charges that would be incurred by
the firm for holding excess capacity until it is needed. In addition,
there is an element of risk in that demand for services may not
materialize as expected. Therefore, a dynamically efficient firm,
124. See William E. Taylor, Efficient Pricing of Telecommunications Services: The
State of Debate, 8 J. Indus. Org. 25, 31 (1993).
125. For example, entry for intercity telecommunications services began in high-
density markets. See W.K. Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 493 (3d
ed. 1997). Similarly, new services, such as DSL were first introduced in more densely
populated areas. See Internet Access: America Online and Bell Atlantic Form Strategic
Partnership to Provide High Speed Access for the AOL Service, Edge On and About
AT&T, 1999 WL 8103043 (Jan. 18,1999).
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which must consider all of these factors in its planning and
operations, will generally fall short of the static efficiency standard
embodied in the construct of a hypothetical firm that can
instantaneously build the capacity required to serve all expected
demand.'26
C. "Back to the Future": A New Way of Looking at Costs in the
Future
The appropriate interpretation of what constitutes forward-
looking economic costs is the expected costs of an actual market
participant. As Coase has observed: "In calculating the costs of an
additional supply of a public utility service, it is of course necessary to
start with the industry as it is, with whatever assets it possesses and
the circumstances in which it finds itself. Costs are rooted in the
actual situation."'27 Examples from economic literature support the
conclusion that the appropriate basis for determining forward-
looking costs is the expected costs of an actual firm in the market and
not the instantaneous entrant.
Taylor asserts that when a new technology is introduced, the
relevant economic costs are based on a mixture of the existing and
new technologies because
the network will not be rebuilt from scratch, and the very
long long-run view of costs identified above is not
appropriate for pricing. The cost that a customer's action
imposes on the network is the cost of the most efficient
response to that action, given the network as it exists
today.
Taylor explains that "forward-looking efficient pricing requires
users to pay the costs they actually impose on the network, not the
126. For example, take the case of an area that is ultimately served with capacity of
1,200 pairs of copper cable. The static model would immediately place a 1,200 pair cable
to satisfy this capacity. However, a dynamically efficient actual firm may arrive at the
1,200 pair capacity over time with, for example, a series of three discrete placements of
400-pair cables. Similarly, an actual entrant, behaving in a dynamically efficient manner
would not instantaneously construct a network to serve all the incumbent's customers.
Among the factors the dynamically efficient firm would consider in making these discrete
placements over time would be: the expected growth in demand; the cost of placing all of
the cable at once versus the cost of multiple placements over time; and the carrying
charge associated with having a period of excess capacity until demand grows.
127. Coase, supra n. 97, at 123.
128. Taylor, supra n. 124, at 31.
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costs they would have imposed had a more efficient network been
put in place.'
129
In a seminal article on marginal cost pricing, Turvey notes that
at any point in time the costs of a firm or industry represent a mixture
of plant vintages and that costs derived from replacing the industry
from scratch are irrelevant:
New plants reflect current technology and changing relative
factor prices and will be built when price exceeds their
average total costs. The oldest plants are scrapped when
they fail to cover their operating costs. In between come a
whole range of plants of various vintages. Thus the cost
structure of the industry in any year depends upon the past
evolution of its gross investment, its technology and relative
factor prices. 30
In assessing the FCC's approach to TELRIC, Kahn has also
expressed his fundamental disagreement with the interpretation of
economic costs as being developed from a "blank slate" versus the
actual expected costs of an existing firm. 3' Kahn argues that the
appropriate standard is the costs that will actually be incurred, not
those of a hypothetical entrant who instantaneously builds its
capacity from a "blank slate."'32
An additional factor suggests that estimating the costs of an
efficient provider do not comport with the TELRIC method. Market
prices tend to reflect the total costs of the least efficient provider that
can survive in the market. This is the natural result of considering the
129. Id.
130. Ralph Turvey, Marginal Cost, Econ. J., 285-86 (1969).
131. Letter from Alfred E. Kahn, Emeritus Prof. of Econ., Cornell U., to Reed E.
Hundt, Commn., Fed. Commun. Commn. (Jan. 14, 1997) (on file with the authors). In
discussing the appropriate cost standards he states, "The general economic principle that
they cite clearly requires, however, that the correct pricing "signals" inform consumers of
the costs that society will actually incur if they take somewhat (or a lot) more of each
good or service." Id.
Advocates of the "blank slate" version of TELRIC typically assume that that is
the level to which competition would drive price, if it were effective. They are mistaken.
In a world of continuous technological progress it would be irrational for firms constantly
to update their facilities in order to incorporate completely today's lowest-cost
technology, as though starting from scratch: investments made today, totally embodying
today's most modern technology, would instantaneously be outdated tomorrow. In
consequence, the investments would never earn a return sufficient to justify the
investment in the first place. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in original); see also Kahn, Letting Go,
supra n. 97, at 89-103.
132. See Kahn letter, supra n. 131, at 2-3.
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price that results from the intersection of the market supply curve
with the market demand curve. The long-run market supply curve
reflects the horizontal summation of the marginal costs of all firms
currently in the market, and all potential firms that could be in the
market.'
3
At any given price, some firms will find the market price
insufficient to allow them to recover all of their costs. These firms are
too inefficient to be able to survive in the market, and such firms will
either never enter the market or will eventually exit from it. Other
firms will earn supracompetitive rents or quasi-rents due to foresight,
superior management, or luck. One or more firms will be at the
razor's edge of remaining in the industry. It is the cost of these
marginal firms that represent the market price. It would be anti-
competitive to force the market price to barely recover the costs of
the most efficient firm in the market. This would be tantamount to an
economic death sentence for all firms besides the most efficient firm.
In addition, the firm that is most efficient at one point in time, may
not always be the most efficient. A hypothetical construct of the most
efficient firm may be one that, in reality, no firm can satisfy in the
long run.
In summary, the idealized, statically efficient entrant
interpretation adopted in the FCC's TELRIC methodology does not
represent the performance of an actual entrant or incumbent in the
market who is dynamically efficient. Actual entrants and incumbents,
who are dynamically efficient will generally deviate from this ideal.
They will do so because of uncertainty, economies of scale in some
dimensions of network construction in combination with demand
growth, and the rapid rate of technological change in the industry.
Therefore, if rates were strictly based on the cost levels produced
from models adhering to the idealized standard of instantaneous
static efficiency, both ILECs and facilities-based CLECs would face
cost recovery problems. These problems would be similar to the ones
that would arise under a very lenient application of the essential
facilities doctrine discussed earlier.'34
133. In the short run, this is the section of the marginal cost above average variable
cost. In the long run, each firm must expect a price at or above its average total cost.
134. See supra n. 87 and accompanying text.
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D. The Legal Rationale Supporting the Back to the Future
Approach
Under the TA96, Section 252(d)(1) sets out the legal
requirements for compensation for ILEC UNEs:
(d) Pricing standards
(1) Interconnection and network element charges
Determinations by a State commission of the just and
reasonable rate for the interconnection of facilities
and equipment for purposes of subsection (c)(2) of
section 251 of this title, and the just and reasonable
rate for network elements for purposes of subsection
(c)(3) of such section -
(A) shall be -
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference
to a rate-of-return or other rate based
proceeding) of providing the interconnection or
network element (whichever is applicable), and
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.1 5
The statutory meaning leaves some ambiguity as to whether
costs should be calculated on a prospective or historical basis. In a
joint statement, Congress added little to flesh out the meaning of
"cost" in Section 252 beyond stating that "[c]harges for
interconnection ... and for network elements ... are to be
determined based on costs may include a reasonable profit.
1 36
The only other legislative history that bears on the question of
cost is the overall purpose of the TA96 to "promote[] competition in
the market for local telephone service."'37 The TA96, however, does
not take an entirely laissez faire approach to telecommunications
policy. The very nature of the additional obligations of ILECs creates
an additional layer of regulation that did not previously exist. In
addition, the TA96 creates new universal service requirements that
subsidize rates to rural health care providers, schools and libraries. 38
135. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).
136. H.R. Rpt. 104-458, at § 125 (Jan. 31, 1996) (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
137) (emphasis added).
137. H.R. Rpt. 104-204, at § 48 (July 24, 1995) (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
11).
138. See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1999). Interestingly, Hausman and Shelanski have
concluded that the present funding mechanisms for universal service have had a negative
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Nonetheless, the House of Representatives set out to do no less than
"lift[] the shackles of monopoly regulation" to open competition in
local telephony.'39 Congress concluded that competition would
benefit consumers with greater innovation and lower prices."' To
meet this goal, costs for UNEs should have some relationship to
promoting competition.
As discussed in Section II, the Eighth Circuit rejected portions
of the TELRIC method of costing UNEs relying primarily on the
plain meaning of Section 252(d)(1). 4' Since the statute requires a
LEC to pay an ILEC an amount "based on the cost ... of providing
the interconnection or network element,' ' 14 2 the cost should be
derived from "the existing local network" that a CLEC "would be
using in an attempt to compete.' ' 143 TELRIC relies on a hypothetical
network using the most efficient technology. The only relationship it
bears to an ILEC's network is simply its geographic scope and
expected demand. Compensating an ILEC for use of network
elements on a hypothetical network, rather than its own may not
provide "just and reasonable rates" as the statute requires.' 4 The
hypothetical network's cost for an UNE may not bear any
meaningful relationship to its actual cost of providing a service. 141
The court analogized a CLEC's access to UNEs via an ILEC's
facilities and equipment as a "piggyback.' 46 According to the court,
the statute requires ILEC compensation for this piggyback.' 47 The
court explained that "[i]t is the cost to the ILEC of providing that
ride on those facilities that the statute permits the ILEC to recoup.' ' 48
Therefore, Congress intended an ILEC to recover the cost of
impact on overall economic welfare. See Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic
Welfare and Telecommunications Regulation: the E-Rate Policy for Universal Service
Subsidies, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 19, 51 (1999).
139. See H.R. Rpt. 104-204, at § 48 (July 24, 1995) (reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
10, 11).
140. See id.
141. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750.
142. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).
143. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).
145. As the Eighth Circuit observed, an ILEC's compensation under TELRIC, as
constructed by the FCC, relied on "state of the art presently available technology ideally
configured but neither deployed nor to be used by the competitor." Iowa Util. Bd., 219
F.3d at 751.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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"carrying the extra burden of the competitor's traffic."'49
In another context under the TA96, regulators have adopted
TELRIC with some limited approval from the courts. " ° In Texas
Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Federal Communications
Commission - a case the United. States Supreme Court has certified
- the Fifth Circuit concluded that TELRIC was an appropriate
measure to estimate universal service subsidies. 151 However, the Fifth
Circuit did not assess "whether it is good policy for the FCC to use
such cost models," and concluded instead that the FCC's approach to
estimating universal service subsidies fit within the framework of the
applicable statute.52 Unlike the statutory mandate of Section 252 that
plainly requires a price to be "based on the cost ... of providing the
interconnection or network element ,''. the applicable statute
governing universal service subsidies is based on entirely different
language that does not appear to take cost into account.'54 Finding the
149. Id.
150. See Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3747 (No. 1244) (2000).
151. Id. at 411.
152. Id.
153. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(4)(i).
154. In contrast to the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i), the statute
governing universal service, 47 U.S.C. § 254(b), espouses the following principles:
(1) Quality and rates
Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and
affordable rates.
(2) Access to advanced services
Access to advanced telecommunications and information
services should be provided in all regions of the nation.
(3) Access in rural and high cost areas
Consumers in all regions of the nation, including low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have
access to telecommunications and information services, including
interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and
information services that are reasonably comparable to those services
provided in urban areas and that are at rates that are reasonably
comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas.
(4) Equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions
All providers of telecommunications services should make an
equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and
advancement of universal service.
(5) Specific and predictable support mechanisms
There should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and
State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
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universal service support statute ambiguous, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the FCC's application of the statute was reasonable.
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that an approach that takes
the ILEC's existing network and projects future costs on the basis of
technological innovations meets the requirements of the TA9615 As
the court explained:
Costs can be forward-looking in that they can be calculated
to reflect what it will cost the ILEC in the future to furnish
to the competitor those portions or capacities of the ILEC's
facilities and equipment that the competitor will use
including any system or component upgrading that the
ILEC chooses to put in place for its own more efficient
use.
156
(6) Access to advanced telecommunications services for schools,
health care, and libraries
Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries should have access to advanced
telecommunications services as described in subsection (h) of this
section.
(7) Additional principles
Such other principles as the Joint Board and the Commission
determine are necessary and appropriate for the protection of the
public interest, convenience, and necessity and are consistent with this
chapter.
Id. § 254 (b).
Section 254(e) further elaborates on the level of the subsidy, stating that it
"should be explicit and sufficient to achieve the purposes of this section." Thus, in Texas
Office of Public Utility Counsel, the appealing party was limited to arguing that Section
254's principle requiring the universal service subsidy to be "equitable and
nondiscriminatory" and the provision requiring the subsidy to be "sufficient" precluded
the application of TELRIC. See 183 F.3d at 411-12. The court disposed of the first part of
this argument by noting that all carriers "are subject to the same cost methodology and
must move toward the same efficient cost level to maximize the benefits of universal
service support." Id. at 412. In disposing of the second half of the argument, the Fifth
Circuit accepted the FCC's arguments that "nothing in the statute defines 'sufficient' to
mean that universal service support must equal the actual costs incurred by ILECs." Id.
The court also noted that other agencies had adopted "similar methodologies." Id. (citing
the Surface Transportation Board's use of stand-alone cost methodology to determine the
reasonableness of railroad rates approved in Burlington N. R.R. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
114 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
155. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 750.
156. Id. The court later stated that "a forward-looking cost calculation that is based on
the incremental costs that an ILEC actually incurs or will incur in providing the
interconnection to its network or the unbundled access to its specific network elements
will produce rates that comply with the statutory requirement of § 252(d)(1) that an ILEC
recover its 'cost' of providing the shared items." Id. at 752-53.
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Indeed, the court rejected the argument put forward by some
ILECs that the TA96 required CLECs to pay ILECs historical
costs. '57 The court found the concept of cost to be sufficiently
ambiguous to encompass either historical cost or forward-looking
cost.'58 As the court observed, the word "cost" itself is like a
"chameleon, capable of taking on different meanings, and shades of
meaning, depending on the subject matter and the circumstances of
each particular usage."'59 Within this elastic meaning of cost, the
court found the FCC's interpretation to be reasonable within the
framework of the statute.'6°
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit noted that other courts had
recognized the forward-looking costs as promoting competition."'
Under the court's approach, a forward-looking pricing method "that
is based on the incremental costs that an ILEC actually incurs or will
incur in providing the interconnection to its network or the
unbundled access to its specific network elements requested by a
competitor will produce rates that comply with the statutory
requirement" set out in the TA96.62 The ILECs raised other
arguments relating to the language of Section 252 that the court also
rejected.'63
In addition to finding a forward-looking cost methodology
reasonable under the statute, the court recognized that such a
benchmark is pro-competitive.'" The Eighth Circuit quoted MCI
Communications for the proposition that:
157. Id. at 752.
158. Id. at 751-53.
159. Id. at 751-52 (quoting Strickland v. Commn., Maine Dept. of Human Servs., 48
F.3d 12,19 (1st Cir. 1995)).
160. Id. at 752. Under established legal standards of review, a court defers to an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute when it is reasonable. See Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)
(cited in Iowa Util. Bd., 291 F.3d at 749).
161. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 752 (citing MCI Commun. v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1983), as an example of this judicial acceptance of
forward-looking costs).
162. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 752-53.
163. Specifically, the ILECs argued that a forward-looking cost benchmark would
not afford them an accounting profit. Id. at 752. However, Section 252(d) does not
promise ILECs and accounting profit. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d). The provision only states that
the regulating body "may include a reasonable profit." Id. § 252(d)(1)(B) (emphasis
added).
164. Iowa Util. Bd., 219 F.3d at 752.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [23:751
PRICING NETWORK ELEMENTS
[I]t is current and anticipated cost, rather than historical
cost that is relevant to business decisions to enter markets
... historical costs associated with the plant already in place
are essentially irrelevant to this decision since those costs
are 'sunk' and unavoidable and are unaffected by the new
production decision.'
Our analysis of a forward-looking cost approach that calculates
costs using the actual network would comport with this assessment.
In being pro-competitive, the approach that the Eighth Circuit
endorsed and we advocate satisfies the goal of promoting
competition for local telephony under the TA96 and is superior to
the alternatives. Provisions such as section 251, contemplate
facilities-based competition where CLECs may construct certain
aspects of a local network while using other aspects of an ILEC's
network. Historical costs do not necessarily reflect the market value
of existing assets, and therefore do not provide the information
necessary to send sound market signals to customers and providers.
Using the hypothetical network that TELRIC contemplates does not
reflect the network that will actually be utilized to provide service
and similarly is flawed in reflecting the costs that actually will be
incurred. As Kahn notes, adopting a hypothetical approach will
actually discourage facilities-based competition contrary to the goals
of the TA96:
In either event, the Commission's prescription reflects a
presumption all too typical of regulators - declaring, in
effect, 'we will determine not what your costs are but what
they ought to be.' That approach has two major defects:
first, that is not how the competitive process works; and
second, its prices would actually discourage competitors
coming in and building their own facilities when that would
be more efficient than using the incumbent's facilities."6
165. Id. (quoting MCI Commun. Inc., 708 F.2d at 1116-17).
166. Kahn letter, supra n. 131, at 2 (emphasis in original).
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IV
Concluding Remarks
The critical element that will determine competition in a regime
that encourages access to an incumbent's facilities is determining the
appropriate price. This is especially true during the transition away
from the regulated monopoly model of local telecommunications
service to a more competitive model. As local telecommunications
markets become more competitive, market forces will increasingly
determine prices, regardless of what is determined by the cost models
regulators employ. However, during the beginning of this transition,
the more accurately UNE and other network costs replicate efficient
markets, the more likely consumers will be able to enjoy the fruits of
competition - avoiding the problems of either too much or too little
entry.
There are at least three different variants of how pricing for
various aspects of the local network could be derived. One approach
estimates historical costs of an ILEC but fails to reflect the market
value of the assets that will be used to provide service. Another
approach, TELRIC, may over-stimulate the leasing of the
incumbent's network because the prices assessed reflect a static ideal
of a hypothetical, efficient firm. Under changing conditions and
uncertainty, an actual efficient firm is likely to deviate from the
TELRIC model. It is our opinion that the preferred approach is one
in which forward-looking economic costs are based on the expected
costs of an actual market participant. This approach reflects a more
dynamic model of the market, where an efficient firm may enter only
partially, or may adopt a mix of older and newer technology for its
network. This approach looks forward to best reflect the costs that
firms will incur. Such properly constructed costs are consistent with
prices and market signals that mimic efficient markets. Using such
costs as the foundation for pricing satisfies the goals of the TA96 to
bring greater competition into local telephony without subsidizing
new entry.
Furthermore, this approach best fits into the legal framework of
the TA96 because it compensates ILECs, as required by the terms of
the statute. The Eighth Circuit recently rejected TELRIC for this
reason and suggested that a forward-looking cost test should employ
actual costs to adequately compensate ILECs. The U.S. Supreme
Court is presently reviewing the Eighth Circuit decision. We believe
that the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is sound on this issue. The goal of
the TA96, to encourage efficient entry into the local telephony will
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best be satisfied by developing a costing system that relies on the
costs firms will actually incur and estimates future network upgrades.
Of course, adopting this modification of a forward-looking cost
model does not resolve all the pricing issues that could either over-
induce or under-induce entry. Other critical elements of a pricing
model could also distort results. When a firm produces multiple
services with shared and common inputs, as a telecommunications
firm often does, significant costs will exist that are not associated with
the incremental cost of any particular service. These non-incremental
costs must be recovered in a manner that is consistent with economic
efficiency and market forces existing at the time.
The possibility that other variables in a costing scheme may
distort the incentives of ILECs and CLECs demonstrates the
complexity of developing a methodology for network elements that
preserves efficient incentives. Judges have appreciated this
complexity by the sparing use of the essential facilities doctrine to
open bottlenecks in antitrust cases. In contrast, the TA96 has
switched the role of the regulator from one of oversight of rates for
customer services at a specified level or range, to one of setting prices
for competitors to use an incumbent's network. Whether this shift in
the regulatory role will spur efficient competition, in spite of the
possibility that regulators will price UNEs incorrectly, remains to be
seen. As this new regulatory regime attempts to define itself, there is
no doubt that the telecommunications industry will continue its
evolution to a competitive market.
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